IT offboarding checklist: credentials and access
Disabling someone's account ends their identity, not the passwords, keys and 2FA secrets they knew. Here is a checklist that ends both, in the right order, with a copyable version for your tickets.
The short answer
An IT offboarding checklist has to end two different things. Disabling a person's accounts ends their identity. It doesn't end the credentials they knew or created: shared passwords, API keys, 2FA secrets, personal access tokens, and sessions that were already open. Each of those has to be revoked or replaced in the system that issued it.
In order:
- Before the last day, list what the person holds, and line up a successor and a replacement for each item.
- At the agreed cutoff, disable the identity, revoke its sessions, and remove the person from groups, vaults and every tool that isn't behind single sign-on.
- The same day, revoke the keys and tokens they created, once their replacements are live, and rotate every shared secret they could read.
- Within the week, recover devices, hand over mail and files, expire open handoff links, and record what ended and how you checked.
The copyable checklist is further down this page.
Who this is for: IT admins at small and mid-sized companies, and MSPs who offboard people for their clients. For a contractor or vendor finishing a job, the contractor and vendor access close-out is the shorter tool.
Why does offboarding leave access behind?
Because the account is the easy part. With single sign-on, disabling one identity cuts off most of a person's apps in a single step, and most offboarding checklists stop there. But anyone who has worked somewhere for a year carries more than one login: the shared password for the social media account, an API key they made for a reporting script, the 2FA secret for a vendor portal in their own authenticator app, a personal access token in their laptop's Git configuration, the firewall admin password someone read out on a call. None of those belong to their identity, so disabling it changes nothing about them.
NIST's security control catalogue draws the same line. Control PS-4, Personnel Termination, in SP 800-53 Rev. 5 lists "disable system access" and "terminate or revoke any authenticators and credentials associated with the individual" as two separate requirements. The second is the one that gets skipped, usually because nobody has a list of what the person held, not because anyone decided to skip it.
Most people leave on good terms, so this isn't mainly about a disgruntled former employee. For most departures the realistic exposure is a credential that still works, sitting in a personal password manager, an old laptop or a chat history, long after everyone has forgotten it exists.
What does disabling an account actually revoke?
Less than the button suggests, and the vendors say so in their own documentation:
- Tokens already issued keep working for a while. Microsoft's guidance on revoking access in Entra ID says access tokens last one hour by default, and that Entra ID can't directly revoke a session token issued by an application: each app ends its own sessions. Block sign-in and revoke sessions, then check the apps that keep sessions of their own.
- Signing someone out is more than one switch. Google's Workspace admin help notes that resetting a user's sign-in cookies doesn't sign them out of apps such as Gmail and Google Drive for desktop. Suspending the user resets the cookies; the apps are handled separately.
- Removing someone doesn't remove their copies. GitHub's documentation says members removed from an organization may still have local copies of its repositories, and that the organization is responsible for making sure confidential information is deleted. Organization owners can review and revoke fine-grained personal access tokens that reach the organization; classic tokens don't appear in that list.
- Cloud access keys aren't part of the identity. An AWS IAM user's access keys work until they are deactivated or deleted, whatever happens in your identity provider.
- A 2FA secret works on any device that holds it. Someone who scanned the setup QR code can generate valid codes until 2FA on that account is set up again.
- A shared password doesn't know who knows it. Changing it is the only way to take it back.
What should an IT offboarding checklist cover?
Every departure touches the same seven kinds of access. Microsoft's own walkthrough for removing a former employee from Microsoft 365 covers several of them for one platform: blocking sign-in, wiping mobile devices, and forwarding mail or converting the mailbox to a shared mailbox. The table covers the rest.
| Kind of access | Examples | How it ends | Evidence to keep |
|---|---|---|---|
| Identity | Entra ID, Google Workspace, Okta account | Block sign-in or suspend; revoke sessions and refresh tokens | Admin log entry and time |
| App accounts outside SSO | Accounting tool, domain registrar, social media, router admin | Disable or remove in each app | The list of apps checked |
| Keys and tokens they created | Cloud access keys, API keys, personal access tokens, bot tokens, CI secrets | Revoke in the issuing service, after replacing what depends on them | Key ID and revocation time, never the value |
| Shared secrets they could read | Shared mailbox or vendor portal passwords, Wi-Fi, break-glass accounts | Rotate, then update the vault item | Which items were rotated, and when |
| 2FA secrets and MFA devices | TOTP for shared logins, devices registered on root accounts | Set up 2FA again, remove their device, regenerate backup codes | Re-enrolment date |
| Devices and local copies | Laptop, phone, Git clones, exported files | Recover and wipe, or get written confirmation of deletion | Asset return record |
| Handoff links and requests | Encrypted links they sent, open credential requests | Expire what is still open | The links expired |
The IT offboarding checklist
Copy this into the ticket for each departure and fill in the brackets. Never write a secret into the ticket: record which item changed, not what it changed to.
IT OFFBOARDING: CREDENTIALS AND ACCESS
Person: [name] Role: [role]
Cutoff: [date, time, timezone]
Ticket owner: [name] Backup: [name]
BEFORE THE LAST DAY
[ ] List their accounts: identity provider, apps outside SSO, admin consoles
[ ] List keys and tokens they created: cloud, API, Git, bots, CI secrets
[ ] List shared secrets they could read: vault collections, shared logins
[ ] List 2FA they hold for shared accounts, and MFA devices they registered
[ ] Find automation that runs as them; move it to a service identity
[ ] Name a successor for each shared login, mailbox and data owner
[ ] Agree the cutoff time with their manager and HR
AT THE CUTOFF
[ ] Block sign-in or suspend in the identity provider
[ ] Revoke sessions and refresh tokens
[ ] Remove from groups, roles and admin rights
[ ] Disable their accounts in apps outside SSO
[ ] Remove from password-manager vaults and shared collections
[ ] Remove from teams in other tools: Git hosting, cloud consoles, CredenShare
SAME DAY
[ ] Revoke keys and tokens they created, once replacements are live
[ ] Rotate shared passwords they could read; update the vault items
[ ] Set up 2FA again on shared accounts; remove their MFA devices;
regenerate backup codes
[ ] Expire handoff links and open credential requests they created
WITHIN A WEEK
[ ] Recover or wipe devices; confirm local copies are deleted
[ ] Hand over or convert their mailbox and files
[ ] Check sign-in logs and "last used" dates for activity after the cutoff
[ ] Record what ended, when, by whom, and how it was checked
[ ] Close the ticket, or list each exception with an owner and a dateHow do you rotate shared credentials without breaking things?
Rotation goes wrong when the old credential is revoked before anyone knows what depends on it, and the payroll export stops working at 2 a.m. The safe order is new first, old last:
- Find every consumer of the credential: people, servers, scheduled jobs, integrations.
- Create the replacement, scoped to what is actually needed. Where a key belonged to the person who is leaving, make the replacement belong to a service account or role instead, so the next departure doesn't repeat this.
- Update every consumer, and deliver the new value to the people who need it once, not in a chat thread.
- Revoke the old one in the issuing service. AWS's procedure for replacing an access key is a good model: deactivate the old key, confirm your applications still work, then delete it.
- Check it no longer works using the service's own evidence, such as a "last used" date or a sign-in log. Don't ask the former employee to try logging in.
Restarting an app or removing a key from a config file doesn't revoke anything. As the OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet puts it, a credential stays usable until the service behind it expires or revokes it. Our guide to sharing and rotating API keys covers the rotation side in more detail, and sharing 2FA codes with your team covers setting up 2FA again.
How do you hand access over to the person taking over?
The successor needs the new credentials, and offboarding happens under time pressure, which is exactly when values get pasted into a chat or an email that lives forever. Rotate first, then hand over the new values, never the old ones.
Put rotated values in the team's password-manager vault where you have one. When someone outside the vault needs a value, send it once in an encrypted link that expires. In CredenShare:
- Create a share with each value in its own field.
- Keep the title generic, for example "Vendor portal, new login". Titles and descriptions are stored readable; the fields are encrypted in your browser.
- Set one view, a short expiry and a passcode (Solo and above), and send the passcode through a different channel.
- Check it was opened with the access log (paid plans) or the activity email.
Shares created from the Slack app are the exception to browser encryption: they are encrypted on CredenShare's servers instead.
What happens to CredenShare access when someone leaves?
Being specific about our own product, since it's one of the tools on the list:
- Removing a member is done by an owner or admin on Members: the row action, then tick the teams to remove them from. Any API key the member holds for a team they are removed from is revoked in the same step.
- Removal doesn't touch their shares. Shares they created stay live for recipients until they expire. An owner or admin sees every member's team shares in the team's Shares list and can expire the ones still open, unless the creator ticked Only Owner Can Delete. Shares the person made in their personal workspace aren't visible to the team, so ask them to expire those before they go.
- Secure requests open only for the account that created them, whatever anyone's role. Have the person move the submissions that are still needed to their destination before their last day: expiring or deleting a request destroys the responses it holds.
- On zero-knowledge teams (Business and Enterprise), removal stops CredenShare serving them the team key, but a device that has already unlocked it keeps it until the team key is rotated. Revoke their grant as well if you want it gone.
CredenShare is a handoff tool, not an identity provider or a secrets manager: it can't find or revoke credentials that live in your other systems. That part of the checklist stays with you.
What evidence should you keep?
For each departure, keep a short record: what ended, when, who did it, and how it was checked, using identifiers such as a key ID or a vault item name rather than values. Anything that couldn't be closed goes on the same record as an exception, with an owner and a date. Verify through admin evidence, such as sign-in logs, session revocation entries and "last used" dates. The status scheme in the contractor close-out works for employees too.
Summary
- Disabling the account ends the identity, not the credentials. Plan for both.
- Make the list before the last day: keys, tokens, shared secrets and 2FA, with a successor and a replacement for each.
- Rotate new first, old last, and check the old credential no longer works using the service's own evidence.
- Hand the new values over once, in a vault or an expiring link, never in chat.
- Keep a record of what ended and how you checked, without the secrets themselves.
Related: Contractor and vendor access close-out · How to share 2FA codes with your team · How to share an API key securely · How to send a password securely · All guides
Sources (checked on November 9, 2026):
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 (PS-4 Personnel Termination) ·
Microsoft: Revoke user access in Microsoft Entra ID ·
Microsoft: Remove a former employee from Microsoft 365 ·
Google Workspace: Sign a user out of a managed Google Account ·
GitHub: Removing a member from your organization ·
GitHub: Reviewing and revoking personal access tokens in your organization ·
AWS: Update access keys ·
OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet ·
CredenShare docs: Members, roles and seats ·
CredenShare docs: Zero-knowledge for teams
Product names are trademarks of their respective owners. CredenShare is not affiliated with them.
Frequently asked questions
Hand the new credentials over once, in a link that expires
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